'An Analysis of 13 Days\r'

'Professor O’Neill Atlantic installations II April 16th 2010 Characterizing the initiative valet de chambre War as an epidemic of miscalculation, chairwoman John F. Kennedy pondered, â€Å"they somehow seemed to tumble into fightfare … through stupidity, individual idiosyncrasies, mis arrangements, and personal complexes of lower post and distinguishedeur” (49). Reflecting upon these miscalculations, Robert F. Kennedy’s thirteen years documents the Cuban Missile Crisis and catalogues the chairman’s contemplative accomplishment amidst potential disaster.Considering the misjudgment that set conflict in the early 20th century, and the socio-techno sensible effigy translation of war, electric chair Kennedy found remedy in the maintenance of kick in channels of external dialogue, while regarding the outside(a) domino effect of to separately one challenge, and exhibiting unending skepticism in pursuit of a serenityful solution. Ge rman sociologist Max weber wrote of the Great War, â€Å"this war, with all its ghastliness, is nevertheless grand and wonderful. It is worth experiencing” (EP 768).Embellishing the heroism of war, Weber reflects a common acceptance of war in the early twentieth century as one of sport and necessity. However, with the development of atomic ordnance store came a paradigm shift concerning war and its manipulation amid international powers. Ack at presentledging the ruinous potential of thermo atomic warfare, Kennedy adamantly declared, â€Å"We were non going to misjudge or take exception the other side needlessly, or sharply push our adversaries into a course of follow up that was non intended” (75).Using diachronic source as his guide, chairwoman Kennedy acts upon the belief that war is rarely intentional, while also recognizing the evolving high-octane of war as one of an arms struggle. The application of this lesson exists in Kennedy’s resolution to utilize isolate as impertinent to armed conflict at the Soviets labor union’s initial threat. Foreign ships give orders to retreat would be afforded such an opportunity, every vessel refusing to offend would nurse its rudders handicapped to avoid loss of life, and ships non be to the Soviet Union were the irst and exactly to be boarded, as to not incite a military response. Executing such action demonstrates the President’s clear understanding of past misjudgment, and the paradigm shift that now characterized war as something not of sport, tho of mass destruction. Robert Kennedy reaffirms such in declaring, â€Å"If we erred, we erred not only for ourselves and our country, moreover for the lives of those who had never been habituated an opportunity to play a role” (81). This statement epitomizes the overwhelming burden of thermonuclear war, and the cognizance necessary to avoid it.Vital to the evasion of miscalculation and the development o f a shared understanding were open channels of communication during the Cuban Crisis. President Kennedy recognized the grandeur of consistent communication to evade brainish action, and promote logically sound decision-making. much(prenominal) an example exists in Robert Kennedy’s Thirteen old age in which Soviet president Khrushchev and President Kennedy mass meeting messages outlining the guidelines towards self-possessed resolution. We essential not succumb to petty passions, or to transient things, besides should realize that if and so war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war” (66). state by Khrushchev in pursuit of vulgar amity, such communication demonstrates the importance of pellucidity and transparency under desperate circumstances. This address further exhibits information of the warped character of warfare, and acknowledges history’s wrongdoings that provoked destruction.President Ke nnedy cerebrate deliberations in stating, â€Å"the effect of such a settlement on easing cosmos tensions would enable us to work towards a more general arrangement … the unite States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms execute” (79). The clear and concise nature of this exchange pass ons praise to the diplomatic nature of Kennedy’s tactics, providing both the unify States and Soviet Union with the opportunity to lastly avoid nuclear holocaust. The snowball effect exhibited through the First World War demonstrates the danger of stunting into conflict through allied duty and diplomatic stupidity.President Kennedy’s ability to tactfully neutralize the Cuban Crisis demonstrates an awareness of that danger, and an grasp for the international domino effect that warfare would generate between nations. Strongly stated by Robert Kennedy, â€Å"we had to be aware of this debt instrument at all times, aware that we were deci sion making for the United States, the Soviet Union, NATO, and for all of manhood” (75). Such concern for the orbiculate replication of warfare can be spy in President Kennedy’s eonian scrutiny of military recommendations and their effect upon the coarse(a) western hemisphere.Seeking alternative solutions to war as well as the approval of global powers, Robert Kennedy further states, â€Å"we were able to establish a firm legal foundation for our action under the OAS charter, and our position around the solid ground was … unanimously supported for a quarantine” (40). This diplomatic strategy, founded upon the support of strong European and American allies, aided the United States in considering the implications of all possible courses of action as to suss out a promise of peace for themselves and the global community.A final strategy, central to the diplomatic gladness of the Cuban Missile Crisis, refers to the shaping and success of Kennedy†™s Executive committee of the National Security Council. While each proposed solution held inherent weaknesses, this committee would stop for constant deliberation, argument, and debate. The ability to scrutinize each proposal reinforced a well-founded decision-making process, thereby diminishing the risk of the spontaneous miscalculation or misjudgment that had prompted war only decades earlier.Embodying the significance of the Executive Committee, Robert Kennedy declares, â€Å"everyone had an equal opportunity to express himself and to be fall upond directly. It was a tremendously advantageous procedure that does not frequently occur within the decision maker branch” (36). Furthermore, President Kennedy is inform to have gone through â€Å"considerable lengths to ensure that he was not insulated from individuals or points of gull because of rank or position” (89).While such an arrangement seems idealistic, President Kennedy’s recognition of all avai lable viewpoints provided an extremely broad base of knowledge upon which to draw conclusions. It was this broad-minded and reasonable approach that was heavily lacking(p) prior to the Great Wars of the early twentieth century, thereby leading to global disasters that may have been averted under more logical circumstances. The measures taken by President Kennedy, as presented through Robert Kennedy’s Thirteen Days, lend overwhelming praise to his diplomatic triumph during the Cuban Missile Crisis.His success is reported as being founded upon the miscalculations of history, and a study of those past errors in pursuit of peaceful relations. However, the idealistic manner in which the President’s actions are portrayed paint a picture of both brotherly admiration and posthumous praise. Such a utopian unveiling only serves to diminish President Kennedy’s heroic role amidst the crisis, and leads the reader to nous how pivotal his leadership actually was. A per sonal memoir of Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days must be read with a grain of salt to properly appreciate its validity as a diachronic record.While the President certainly acknowledged the socio-technological paradigm shift of modern warfare in addition to the stupidity from which the First World War emerged, Thirteen Days well-nigh obviously dismisses crucial events preceding the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bay of Pigs Invasion, an unsuccessful search by American-trained Cuban refugees to overthrow the government activity of Fidel Castro, completely contradicts President Kennedy’s speculate cognizance of the dangers of nuclear war and spontaneous military action.The failed invasion, initiated only three months afterward President Kennedy’s inauguration, humiliated the formation and made communist nations distrustful of the United States. In addition, John F. Kennedy is consistently praised passim his brother’s memoir for have the viewpoints of not just government administrators, but regular people. For example, â€Å"he wanted the advice of his console officers, but he also … wished to hear from Tommy Thompson” (89). However, not once throughout Kennedy’s memoir does he mention address to field of battle soldiers or their names.The generic denominate of Tommy Thompson reduces the author’s faith in such sources, and President Kennedy is even shown to fling military figures in stating, they â€Å"lacked the ability to find beyond the limited military field” (90). Such evidence cannot be lose in determining the validity of President Kennedy’s success, and reduces the objectivity of this historical source. However, the ultimate success of President Kennedy’s historical reflections and peace-seeking measures cannot be denied.While Thirteen Days nearly emits audible applause for his actions, it accurately reports the measures taken to subdue the Cuban Missile Crisis, the durabilit y of quarantine and the importance of bargaining and communication. These actions, prompted through the establishment of the Executive Committee, resulted in the remotion of nuclear arms from Cuba and the reestablishment of the global status quo. Rescuing our nation on the brink of nuclear war, the reader has no choice but to close Thirteen Days with a deeper admiration for the courage and wisdom of President Kennedy.\r\n'